Ehsan Emamjomeh-Zadeh


Online Learning

  Friday, 03 January 2020
  09:00 - 09:45


In several games, information is asymmetric. Consider, for example, an auctioneer who knows more about the item than the bidders. In such scenarios, the parties who have additional information may benefit by "signaling" other parties some or all the information they have. Signaling, however, is not limited to auctions. The news each news agency broadcast to its audience and the recommendation letters each professor writes for her/his students are some other more relatable(!) examples of signaling in our life.

In this talk, we will model signaling more formally and, as much as time permits, discuss a simple probabilistic proof technique which is useful in a this context and many more. If you like brain teasers, we solve some together as well.


Ehsan received his B.Sc in Computer Engineering at Sharif University of Technology in 2013 and his Ph.D. in Computer Science at University of Southern California in 2019. In his Ph.D., under supervision of David Kempe and Shaddin Dughmi, his research was focused on theoretical computer science. More specifically, he has worked on game theory and online learning. Since August 2019, he is a research scientist at Facebook Inc.